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Abstract in English
There are doubts about the effectiveness of regional policy. Well known are the fruitless attempts
of Italy to bridge the gap between the Mezzogiorno and the North, of Germany to bridge the gap
between the Neue Länder and the West, and of the European Commission to reduce regional
disparities in general. We validate one explanation: agglomeration advantages lock business
activity in relatively prosperous core regions, even though wages – and thus production costs –
tend to be higher there. We set off from the ‘New Economic Geography’, a set of general
equilibrium models that focus on location choice. Theory, descriptive statistics, and econometric
analysis support the conclusion that the European economic geography is characterized by a
network of local and stable core periphery systems. This implies that disparities between core
regions and their peripheries at a (sub) provincial level of regional aggregation are with us to
stay, as regional policy targeted on peripheries tends to be insufﬁcient to counter centripetal
market forces. Moreover, even if such policy has an impact, it may be adverse, as core regions
may beneﬁt disproportionately in the long run. A focus of regional policy on local
agglomerations, which have a realistic chance to hold on to economic activity, is therefore
desirable.
Abstract in Dutch
Er bestaan twijfels over de doeltreffendheid van regionaal beleid. Bekend zijn de ijdele pogingen
van Italië om de kloof tussen de Mezzogiorno en het Noorden te overbruggen, van Duitsland om
de kloof tussen de Neue Länder en het Westen te overbruggen, en van de Europese Commissie
om regionale ongelijkheden in het algemeen te verminderen. Wij valideren een in het oog
springende verklaring: agglomeratievoordelen houden economische bedrijvigheid in kernregio’s
vast, ondanks dat daar de lonen – en dus de productiekosten – hoger zijn. Wij gaan uit van de
‘Nieuwe Economische Geograﬁe’, een verzameling algemeen evenwichtsmodellen die zich op
locatie keuze richten. Theorie, beschrijvende statistiek, en econometrische analyse ondersteunen
de conclusie dat de Europese economische geograﬁe adequaat beschreven kan worden als een
netwerk van lokale en stabiele kern-periferie systemen. Hieruit volgt dat ongelijkheden tussen
kernregio’s en hun periferie op een (sub)provinciaal niveau van regionale aggregatie moeilijk te
verkleinen zijn omdat regionaal beleid gericht periferieën in de regel onvoldoende is om de
middelpuntzoekende marktkrachten teniet te doen. Bovendien, zelfs als dergelijk beleid invloed
heeft, dan kan het onbedoeld nadelig uitpakken omdat op de lange duur vooral de kern
bedrijvigheid naar zich toe trekt. Een nadruk van regionaal beleid op lokale agglomeraties is
daarom wenselijk.
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Some European regions host a lot of economic activity, whereas others are virtually empty. The
more proﬁtable ﬁrms tend to be located in the densely populated core regions. It suggests that
the economic geography – a shorthand for the distribution of economic activity over physical
space – is linked to regional disparities of productivity and income.
Regional policy makers have long understood the link. Until recently, they followed a simple
and persuasive line of reasoning. If a region lags behind, then it lacks ‘competitiveness’. And
competitiveness can, so they claimed, be improved by channeling public funds towards projects
intended to lure ﬁrms from the core, or towards interregional infrastructure intended to give
ﬁrms in the lagging region a better market access.
This type of policy is, at best, not an unqualiﬁed success. The economic geography is hard to
mould. Hence, the funds have by and large failed to bring about the desired reduction in regional
disparities. This has initiated a shift in thinking about regional policy: perhaps we should not
continue to focus on lagging peripheries, but instead channel funds to local agglomerations that
have a realistic chance to hold on to economic activity.
The study is a joint project of geographical economists in academia and the CPB. Harry
Garretsen and Marc Schramm are afﬁliated to the University of Utrecht, Steven Brakman to the
University of Groningen, and Joeri Gorter and Albert van der Horst to the CPB. Their
cooperation enabled the application of recent developments of theory and estimation in the ﬁeld
of geographical economics. Acknowledged are the contributions of Carsten Schürmann
(University of Dortmund) who provided the indispensable data on distances, and Steven
Poelhekke (University of Utrecht) who assisted with the econometric analysis. Furthermore,
Jacco Hakfoort, Sip Oegema (both Ministry of Economic Affairs), Marcel Canoy, Casper van
Ewijk, George Gelauff, Berend Hasselman, Richard Nahuis, Wouter Vermeulen (all CPB),
Charles van Marrewijk (Erasmus University Rotterdam) and Maarten Bosker (University of






The European Union is one of the most prosperous parts of the world. Yet there are large
regional disparities in productivity, wages, and employment, and they have only increased with
the recent enlargement. Thus, there seems to be ample justiﬁcation for helping lagging regions
to catch up, both at the national and the European level. Unfortunately, regional policy appears
to be ineffective. Well known are the fruitless attempts of Italy to bridge the gap between the
Mezzogiorno and the North, of Germany to bridge the gap between the Neue Länder and the
West, and of the European Commission to reduce regional disparities in general.
This study validates one explanation of the ineffectiveness of regional policy. We set off from
the New Economic Geography (NEG), a relatively new branch of economics that incorporates
agglomeration advantages and location choice in a formal general equilibrium framework. By
estimating the key parameters of NEG models with European regional data, we are able to
underpin the conclusion that dogged attempts to make lagging regions catch up are often
doomed to fail. Lagging regions do not stand alone, but pertain to local core-periphery systems.
Economic activity lured to the periphery by subsidies will in the long run end up in the core.
This is because the periphery lacks the critical economic mass.
Chapter 2: Theory
Regional policy demands a theory that explains the location of production and consumption.
Since the early nineties economists have such a theory at their disposal: the NEG unites within a
consistent general equilibrium framework older insights from international trade theory and
spatial economics.
Firms and workers are subject to centripetal and centrifugal market forces. The owner of a
ﬁrm must choose a location for his plant. If he chooses a core region, i.e. a region with a large
market, then he saves on trade costs. Less goods will have to ‘exported’ to other regions.
Therefore, he can set a lower price, and thus capture a larger share of the market. If he chooses a
peripheral region, i.e. a region with a small market, then he faces less competition from other
local ﬁrms. Moreover, he evades urban costs such as congestion and high land prices. Similarly,
a worker must choose a location where to live and work. If he chooses a core region, then he gets
a higher real wage. If he chooses a peripheral region, he evades urban costs.
The list of centripetal and centrifugal forces working on ﬁrms and workers can be extended,
and differs between NEG models. The common denominator of the models is, however, that
location decisions depend on the balance of these forces, which in their turn depend on trade
costs. A range of trade costs supports an even distribution of economic activity. We call this state
the ‘dispersion equilibrium’. A complementary range supports an uneven distribution of
economic activity, in which one region hosts a disproportionate amount. We call this state the
‘agglomeration equilibrium’.
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The agglomeration equilibrium is characterised by a spatial wage structure: agglomeration
advantages materialise as higher wages in core regions. Moreover, the causality of location
choice underlying the equilibrium is circular: ﬁrms and workers prefer the core since it has the
largest market; the core has the largest market since it host many ﬁrms and workers. Thus, if
agglomeration equilibria are the rule, regional disparities are difﬁcult to counter with regional
policy.
Chapter 3: Descriptive Statistics
What does the European economic geography look like? A satellite picture of Europe reveals
banana shaped beam of light running from London to Milan that indicates a large cluster of
economic activity. Zooming in reveals, moreover, that similar core-periphery structures repeat
themselves at lower levels of aggregation. Agglomeration is ubiquitous.
Descriptive statistics conﬁrm the eyeball analysis of the satellite picture. It indicates that
agglomeration is especially pronounced at a (sub) provincial level of regional aggregation.
Moreover, the little movement in the location of economic activity that can be discerned is
attributable to the increasing importance of services as compared to agriculture and
manufacturing. Agglomeration is local and stable.
Chapter 4: Dispersion and Agglomeration
The econometric analysis has a dual purpose. First, it validates the NEG by verifying a spatial
wage structure. Second, it yields estimates of key parameters that we can plug into NEG models
in order to run simulations in a ‘theory with numbers’ fashion.
The spatial wage structure emerges from a confrontation of the canonical wage equation with
European regional data. The estimates imply a strong agglomeration advantage that quickly
peters out over distance. This concords with the descriptive statistics of the previous chapter.
The theory with numbers serves to identify the equilibrium regime. It turns out that the
agglomeration equilibrium prevails for a typical pair of contiguous NUTS2 regions. Hence,
regional disparities at this and smaller levels of regional aggregation are difﬁcult to counter.
Chapter 5: Regional Policy
It is unsurprising that regional policy often fails to reduce regional disparities in productivity and
income. Core regions tend to be better off than their surrounding peripheries. And
core-periphery structures are hard to upset since agglomeration advantages pull economic
activity to the cores.
In this light the recent shift in thinking on regional policy makes sense. Policy makers seem
more willing to recognise that disparities between provinces, and between regions within
provinces are persistent. They increasingly target the available funds on regional growth poles.
There is, however, an equity-efﬁciency trade off. Agglomeration is positively related to
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overall productivity and growth, but negatively to wage equality. Moreover, improving the
market access of peripheral regions with infrastructure – or any other initiative that promotes
economic integration – may in fact increase regional disparities. It increases the incentive to
locate in the core once the peripheral market can be supplied from here with more ease. If one is
to improve the fate of lagging regions, then a focus on large regions that contain their own core




The failure of regional policy to substantially reduce regional disparities qualiﬁes as a stylised
fact. Italy and Germany have pushed hard to develop the Mezzogiorno respectively the Neue
Länder. The efforts have been, however, of little avail. The peripheral regions continue to lag
behind in employment, productivity, and wages. The cohesion policy of the European
Commission, which annually allocates tens of billions of euro’s to lagging regions all across the
EU, has been equally ineffective.1 Why?
A somewhat cynical explanation is that the available funds are wasted on nonsensical
projects such as highways from nowhere to nowhere. Of course, ‘cathedrals in the desert’ have
been built. But it is only fair to admit that most funds are spent on projects that, at least on paper,
seem to be economically viable. There must be more to it.
One explanation is that peripheral regions lack the critical mass to hold on to economic
activity. Regional policy may be temporarily successful in luring economic activity towards the
periphery. But in the long run it will end up in the core. Even worse, reducing the interregional
freeness of trade by large infrastructure projects, by product harmonisation, or by any other act
that fosters economic integration may have a perverse impact on the periphery: it may become
proﬁtable for ﬁrms to relocate to the core and serve the peripheral market from there.
Until recently, the scientiﬁc underpinning of this explanation was scattered across the
economic literature in an eclectic set of regional science papers. Fujita et al. (1999) integrated
the prime insights from this literature in a consistent general equilibrium framework, and dubbed
it the New Economic Geography (NEG). Brakman and Garretsen (2003, p.638) predicate that it
is “to date the only theory within mainstream economics that takes the economics of location
seriously”.
A major insight from Baldwin et al. (2003), Midelfart (2004) and other studies within the
NEG framework is that regions do not stand alone, but pertain to core periphery systems.
Disregarding the interaction between the individual regions may lead to an unexpected and
adverse impact of regional policy.
However powerful the insight may be, a problem of the NEG remains its lack of empirical
grounding. As with most innovations within economic science, initial contributions show a
strong bias towards theory. Consequently, many empirical questions – such as the geographical
scale on which agglomeration advantages operate – remain to be answered. Therefore, we do not
attempt to perfect theory, but confront existing tenets with European regional data. With the help
of descriptive statistics and the econometric estimation of the key parameters of the NEG, we ﬁll
in some of the empirical blind spots.
1 For surveys of the academic literature on the effectiveness of regional policy, see Bijvoet and Koopmans (2004),
Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) and Ederveen et al. (2002).
13NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY:INTRODUCTION
A prime contribution of this study is the identiﬁcation of the economic scale at which
agglomeration advantages shape the economic geography. We ﬁnd that the European economic
geography comprises local and stable core periphery systems. This is backed up by strong and
localised agglomeration advantages. It implies that regional policy at the (sub) provincial scale is
likely to be ineffective, as it has to overcome centripetal market forces that induce a preference
for location in the local core. The ﬂip side of the coin is that at larger geographical scales
regional policy retains its potential to reduce disparities. The conclusion is, not incidentally,
consistent with an income convergence at national level, but a lack of it at the regional level.2
More agglomeration is not necessarily bad. The rationale of the Single Market Program rests
primarily on exploitation of comparative advantages, which involves a shift of economic activity
between Member States such that the location of production is in concordance with the location
of production factors. Moreover, pleas for more agglomeration reveals an awareness of
agglomeration externalities, i.e. of positive spillover-effects between co-locating economic
agents.
The incoherence of the simultaneous promotion of clustering and dispersion is conspicuous.
It exempliﬁes that choosing an optimal point on the efﬁciency-equity tradeoff is no mean feat.
We do not, however, intend to determine which of the two strands of regional policy is superior.
We ask instead a more fundamental question: how malleable is the European economic
geography, and what does its (limited) malleability imply for the design of regional policy?
We must put forward a caveat. The empirical validation of the NEG is a relatively novel
enterprise, and this study is by no means the last word on the issue. In addition, data limitations
preclude a thorough sectoral decomposition. Finally, there are many (unobserved) reasons why
an instance of regional policy has had, or has not had the desired effect for a particular subset of
regions.
Since parts of this study are quite technical, we suggest readers primarily interested in policy
implications to focus on chapter 2, and then jump to chapter 5. Readers interested in the
empirics of the European economic geography should also have a look at chapters 3 and 4.
2 See Martin (2001).
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2 Theory
2.1 Introduction
Peripheral regions may lack the critical mass to hold on to economic activity. Consequently,
regional policy may be only temporarily successful in luring economic activity toward the
periphery. Even worse, reducing the interregional freeness of trade by large infrastructure
projects, by product harmonisation, or by any other act that fosters economic integration may
have a perverse impact on the periphery since it may become proﬁtable for ﬁrms to relocate to
the core and serve the peripheral market from there. The NEG combines insights from regional
science within a consistent general equilibrium framework. It stands as the only theory within
mainstream economics that takes the economics of location seriously. In this chapter we present
an intuitive and non-technical introduction to the NEG.3
2.2 First and Second Nature
There are two basic causes of agglomeration. First nature causes are land, climate, navigable
waterways, immobile labour, etc. These are regional endowments that cannot easily be changed.
Second nature causes refer to a circularity in location choice. Firms want to be where large
market are, and large markets are where many ﬁrms are located. Note that there is no a priori
reason for a region to host a large market. An initial minor advantage of one region over another
can evolve into a stable core- periphery pattern.
Heckscher-Ohlin theories of international trade are about ﬁrst nature causes. On the basis of
endowments we are able to understand why ﬁrms in one region tend to produce labour intensive,
and in another capital intensive goods. Within the conﬁnes of these theories the absence of
location choice is not a major drawback. International factor prize equalisation makes
international factor movements redundant.
This is, however, not good enough for our purpose. Dixit and Norman (1980) point out that
factor equalisation does not hold for non-standard instances of the Heckscher-Ohlin model,
where the number of production factors is not equal to the number of goods. More important,
Heckscher-Ohlin theories only explain specialisation patterns and not agglomeration of
economic activity per se.
3 We discuss the details of the NEG in chapter 4.
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The NEG is about second nature causes. It explicitly incorporates location. This is important
since there are ample indications that second nature causes are indispensable for understanding
the economic geography of Europe.4 Moreover, it gives more clues for regional policy.
Endowments are given by deﬁnition, but location can in principle be inﬂuenced.
But endowments also matter, if only as ‘nuclei of condensation’ that give one region an
initial advantage over another. Forslid et al. (2002) and Ricci (1999) combine ﬁrst and second
nature causes along this line of reasoning.
2.3 Agglomeration and Trade
Agglomeration and trade are linked. Trade costs and increasing returns to scale induce a
preference for regions with a large market access. Since regions that host a large number of
plants also have a large market access, location choice is a circular process: if one ﬁrm prefers a
region, the next does so a fortiori.
Agglomeration of economic activity is, however, not an equilibrium for high trade costs.
Supplying distant markets from a single plant is too expensive. Neither is agglomeration an
equilibrium for low trade costs. The pecuniary advantages of co-location dwindle as imports are
hardly more expensive than locally produced goods. Thus, in many NEG models agglomeration
is a bell shaped function of the freeness of trade, φ, which is the reciprocal of trade costs.
Building blocks of the NEG
Mobility of production factors This assumption distinguishes the NEG from trade theory. It makes location choice pos-
sible.
Increasing returns to scale Production with a single plant is cheaper than with multiple plants. It makes location choice
expedient.
Trade costs Trade over physical distance is costly. It induces a preference for location in regions with a
large market access.
Figure 2.1 displays the bell. It is the equilibrium distribution of economic activity over two
initially similar regions (vertical axis) as a function of the freeness of trade (horizontal axis). For
a wide range of freeness of trade the distribution remains ﬁfty-ﬁfty for ex ante similar regions. If,
however, ongoing economic integration pushes the freeness of trade beyond threshold φB, then
an uneven distribution, in which one region hosts a disproportionate amount of activity, prevails.
The core-periphery structure is stable for a range of intermediate trade costs. Within this
range the balance tips in favour of centripetal market forces, and the circular causality of
location choice comes into play. Beyond a threshold φB, the economic geography returns to
4 See chapters 3 and 4.
16AGGLOMERATION AND TRADE
a dispersion equilibrium, as the advantages of co-location dwindle, and direct costs of
agglomeration become more prominent.
The break points constitute the border between the dispersion and agglomeration equilibria.
There is not necessarily catastrophic shift in economic activity, because congestion and other
trade cost independent market forces choke off the agglomeration advantages. For now we are
satisﬁed with reiterating that in between break points φB and φB centripetal market forces
dominate centrifugal market forces. Whether or not an NEG-model includes the second break
point φB depends on assumptions about urban costs and labour mobility. In chapter 4 we discuss
two classes of NEG-models in more detail.





a The x-axis displays the freeness of trade, ranging from autarky (inﬁnite trade costs) to free trade (zero trade costs). The y-axis displays
the proportion of mobile economic activity located in one of the two regions. φB and φB are the break points at which the equilibrium
regime shifts from dispersion to agglomeration and vice versa.
How does the circular causality of location choice work? Migrant workers spend their income
locally. Their demand in the newly emerging core region beneﬁts indigenous ﬁrms. This
increases the incentive for extraneous ﬁrms to follow the migrants. Their demand for labour
pushes up the wage rate. This attracts even more migrants, etc. More precise, the centripetal and
centrifugal forces that work on ﬁrms are:
1. An increase of the number of local ﬁrms reduces the demand for a ﬁrm’s good through an
increase of cheap substitutes.
2. An increase of the number of local competitors reduces a ﬁrm’s production costs through access
to more locally produced intermediate inputs.
17NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY:THEORY
3. An increase of the number of local ﬁrms raises demand for a ﬁrm’s variety insofar it is used as
an intermediate input.
4. An increase of the number of local ﬁrms increases production costs though a higher local wage
rate.
And the forces on workers are:
1. An increase of the number of ﬁrms reduces prices of consumption goods.
2. An increase of the number of ﬁrms raises demand for labour.
3. An increase of the number of workers raises competition for vacancies.
Recall that ﬁrst nature advantages often give one region an initial advantage over another, and
thus serve as nuclei of condensation. Moreover, direct agglomeration advantages such as
knowledge spillovers between co-located ﬁrms, enforce the circular causality.
Without a backstop, the circular causality would drive the economic geography towards
extreme agglomeration. The drift to the core of workers and ﬁrms stalls, however, because urban
costs such as pollution, congestion, high housing prices, as well as high nominal wages due to
labour immobility, choke off the centripetal forces.
Table 2.1 lists the centripetal and centrifugal forces for both ﬁrms and workers. The list is not
comprehensive nor precise, since the details of the forces depend on the exact model one has in
mind. The table is best interpreted as a common denominator of the forces that one encounters
in a wide range of models.
Table 2.1 Centripetal and centrifugal forces
Centripetal Centrifugal
Firms
Proximity to ﬁrms High demand from ﬁrms Strong competition from cheap substitutes
Access to cheap intermediate inputs Strong competition for labour
Proximity to workers High demand from consumers
Weak competition for labour
Workers
Proximity to ﬁrms High demand for labour
Access to cheap consumption goods
Proximity to workers Strong competition for vacancies
Miscellaneous Direct agglomeration advantagesa Urban costsb
Endowmentsc Tax gapd
a Knowledge spillovers
b Pollution, congestion, high prices of houses and other non tradables
c Availability of a natural harbour, primary inputs
d (Positive) difference between tax burden in the core and the periphery
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Note that most forces depend on market interactions. Migration of workers and relocation of
ﬁrms affect prices and through them the balance between beneﬁts and costs of location in the
core. Thus, agglomeration advantages may be substantial even in the absence of ﬁrst nature
causes or direct agglomeration advantages such as knowledge spillovers. Note also that
centripetal as well as centrifugal forces increase in trade costs. The reason is that they hinge on
price differences between locally produced and imported goods, and that these price differences
in their turn increase in trade costs.
Whether or not the circular causality of location choice underpins the stability of an
agglomeration equilibrium depends on the interplay between these forces. What matters is their
balance. As long as it tips in favour of centrifugal forces, dispersion is the rule. But when falling
trade costs push the freeness of trade beyond threshold φB, the centripetal forces dominate, and
the circular causality comes into play. Beyond threshold φB the system returns to dispersion in
the face of trade cost independent centrifugal forces. These are related to intermediate inputs
(Venables, 1996), ﬁxed factors (Helpman, 1998), or the labour market (Tabuchi and Thisse,
2002; Crozet, 2004).
The thresholds φB and φB should be the focal point of the analysis. The reason is that
attempts to lure economic activity to the periphery is marginally successful under a dispersion
regime, and is likely to fail under an agglomeration regime. It is only in the neighbourhood of
the thresholds that regional policy has a large potential.






a The x-axis depicts the freeness of trade, ranging from autarky to complete absence of trade barriers and other transport costs. The
y-axis depicts the gap between the real wages for mobile workers in the core and the periphery under the assumption of extreme
agglomeration.
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This is illustrated by Figure 2.2. It represents the gap between real wages in two regions under
the assumption of extreme agglomeration. In NEG-terms, it represents the sustainability of a
core-periphery equilibrium. The crux is that one can only expect large effects of regional policy
if the freeness of trade is in the neighbourhood of break point φB or φB. These borderline cases
are, however, the exception. In general, once core-periphery systems have evolved it is hard to
upset them. This is what Baldwin et al. (2003) call the hysteresis property of economic
geography.
2.4 Agglomeration and Growth
The equilibrium distribution of economic activity over two regions has been central to the
previous discussion. Agglomeration may, however, not only impact on the distribution, but also
on the growth of economic activity.
Marshall (1920) states that local innovation depends on local stocks of knowledge. Baldwin
et al. (2001) and Baldwin and Martin (2003) join his position by explaining this home-bias by
pointing to the importance of face-to-face contacts for knowledge transmission. Thus,
agglomeration and growth are positively related if knowledge and production are co-located. In
other words, “growth, through innovation, spurs spatial agglomeration of economic activities
which in turn leads to a lower cost of innovation and higher growth so that a circular causation
between growth and the geographic concentration of economic activities sets in” (Martin and
Ottaviano, 2001, p. 948). Regional divergence results.
This is in line with the spatial variants of endogenous growth models developed by Romer
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991). Baldwin et al. (2001) derives a picture that is similar
to Figure 2.1, where economic growth emerges as an additional centripetal force.
2.5 Agglomeration and Equity
Migrant ﬁrms and workers gain, otherwise they would not migrate. But what about the welfare
of ﬁrms and workers that stay behind? And what about social welfare? Figure 2.3 illustrates the
impact of positive and negative spillovers on the welfare of mobile and immobile workers in the
core and the periphery. It displays the time paths of the real wages of each of the four groups
against a background constituted by the Krugman (1991) model and an assumption of a steady
drift of workers from the periphery to the core.5 The nonlinear nature of the graphs is due to the
assumption that the annual migration depends on:
5 The simulation is based upon the equations for wages, prices and expenditures as given in equations (B2.2) and
(B2.13-15) in Baldwin et al. (2003, ch. 2). We assume: the elasticity of substitution ε = 5; the share of the mobile sector
δ = 0.2; no intermediates µ = 0. See appendix B.1 for more details of the Krugman-model. Crozet (2004) and Baldwin
et al. (2003, p.49) adopt similar assumptions.
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1. the gap between real wages in the core and the periphery,
2. the number of mobile workers in the periphery.
The gap is small initially, implying a small rate of migration, and a small change in real wages.
In the long-run, migration is curbed by the small number of mobile workers left in the periphery.









a The graphs show the impact of agglomeration on the real wages of two types of employees (mobile or immobile) in two regions, the
core in the left graph and the periphery in the right graph.
Agglomeration reduces prices in the core, and increases prices in the periphery. Workers in the
agglomeration gain, and workers in the periphery lose. Thus, agglomeration increases
interregional inequity.
Mobile workers are able to respond to the variation in real wages. Their drift to the core
increases their scarcity in the periphery and decreases it in the core. This tempers the welfare
gain for mobile workers in the core, but boosts the welfare of those that for the time being stay
behind in the periphery. Immobile workers are unable to respond to variation in real wages. If
they live in the periphery their real wages decrease through a worse access to cheap locally
produced varieties. Thus, agglomeration increases intra regional inequity in the periphery, but
reduces it in the core.
In short, it is unclear whether agglomeration increases or reduces overall equity, let alone
overall social welfare. In Ottaviano et al. (2002, p.432) the ambiguity “ﬁnds its origin in the
simultaneous working of many potential sources of distortions”. In Helpman (1998) the winners
are capable of compensating the losers, but in Baldwin et al. (2003) they are not. More robust
conclusions are, however, possible if one drops the assumption that agglomeration is neutral to




NEG models do not easily divulge testable predictions. The data requirements are substantial
and it is difﬁcult to discriminate between NEG and competing explanations based on ﬁrst nature
advantages or direct agglomeration externalities. This, in conjunction with the newness of the
theory, lies at the root of the still somewhat meager empirical validation. Nevertheless, Head and
Mayer (2003a) list ﬁve testable predictions that have served as the basis of a small but growing
literature. They are:
1. Factor prices tend to be high in regions with good access to the market. Niebuhr (2004) shows
that market access explains about half of the spatial variation of wages in Europe.
2. Mobile production factors ﬂow towards regions with a high market access. Crozet (2004)
veriﬁes this prediction for Europe.
3. Mobile sectors tend to be disproportionately clustered in regions with an idiosyncratically strong
demand for their goods. Davis and Weinstein (1999, 2003) demonstrate that the elasticity of
output with respect to home demand exceeds unity for OECD industries; Trionfetti (2001) and
Brülhart and Trionfetti (2002) estimate that between a quarter and a half of total European
manufacturing output is subject to these home market effects.
4. Reductions in trade costs induce agglomeration. This prediction holds for the Krugman (1991)
model but has to be dropped for the more recent models that yield the bell curve as the locus of
equilibria.
5. The location of economic activity is insensitive to shocks. Davis and Weinstein (2002) and
Brakman et al. (2004a) demonstrate that the bombing of Japanese and German cities had little or
no long run impact on the distribution of economic activity.















1841 1881 1921 1961 2001
Dublin vicinity
a The population ﬁgures of Madrid and its vicinity are obtained from the web site of the Council of Madrid:
http://www.munimadrid.es/estadistica/
b The vicinity of Dublin consists of the counties Kildare, Meath and Wicklow; Source: Central Statistics Ofﬁce, Ireland.
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Let us add several other observations in support of the NEG. First, the bell-curve typically
emerges from time series data of agglomerations such as Madrid and Dublin and their
surrounding peripheries, as displayed in Figure 2.4, where we assume that the freeness of trade
increases over time. Second, Cornet and Rensman (2001) ﬁnd evidence for co-location of R&D
activities. Third, Bottazzi and Peri (2003) establish the locality of the corresponding spillovers.
Fourth, Black and Henderson (1999) verify the implied positive relation between agglomeration
and growth as well as the negative relation between agglomeration and equity. Finally,
Yamamoto (2003) ﬁnds a link between agglomeration and the use of intermediate inputs.
2.7 Conclusion
The economic geography is shaped by endowments and location choice. Through market
interactions location choice depends on itself. This circular causality gives core-periphery
structures a putty-clay character. The freeness of trade of trade is pivotal: at intermediate levels
agglomeration tends to be stable. The scope of regional policy in shaping the economic
geography is therefore limited. The empirical support for the NEG is growing. In the next





The new economic geography (NEG) has done much to increase academic interest in the
location of economic activity. Progress has been largely conﬁned to theoretical contributions.
The body of empirical work is, however, growing rapidly. This chapter establishes several
stylised facts, and is the upbeat for the econometric analysis of the next chapter.
Spatial clustering of economic activity is ubiquitous. In a recent paper for the Dutch Royal
Economic Society, van Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (2003) report an uneven distribution
worldwide, irrespective of the kind of activity or the level of economic and regional aggregation.
Satellite pictures of light pollution is illustrative for the clustering of activity. Figure 3.1 reveals
a banana-shaped curve of intense light that cuts through an otherwise darker continent, from the
English Midlands down to Northern Italy. One may also discern Madrid, Paris, and a large
number of other autonomous agglomerations.
Figure 3.1 Light pollution of Europea
a Source: http://www.inquinamentoluminoso.it/
Zooming in on Italy unveils a similar picture: there is a clear core periphery pattern, with a
remarkable density of ﬁrms and people producing the bulk of value added on relatively few
square kilometres. The statistics of this chapter indicate that the core-periphery patterns at the
sub provincial level are, even more than the ‘banana’, characteristic of the European economic
geography. They are, moreover, stable.
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Figure 3.2 Light pollution of Italya
a Source: http://www.inquinamentoluminoso.it/
3.2 Concentration and Specialisation
In essence, we set out to describe the economic reality corresponding to Figures and 3.1 and 3.2.
This is “a far less trivial exercise than might seem at ﬁrst sight”, as Head and Mayer (2003a,
p.31) aptly put it. The spatial clustering of economic activity is a multidimensional phenomenon
that can be measured in different ways.
The canonical way is to break total economic activity down to industries and regions.
Subsequently, the observed distribution of economic activity of a particular industry over the
regions is compared with a benchmark distribution in which clustering is absent. If it is biased
towards a subset regions, the industry is by deﬁnition ‘concentrated’. Similarly, if the economic
activity of a particular region is biased towards a subset of industries, the region is by deﬁnition
‘specialised’.
This raises a number of questions:
1. What is the appropriate measure of economic activity?
2. What is the appropriate economic and geographical breakdown?
3. What is the appropriate ‘no-clustering’ benchmark?
4. What is the appropriate statistic?
Since the NEG gives little guidance it is unsurprising that the literature comprises a wide array
of different answers. If one is to distill stylised facts, a careful review is imperative.
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Most researchers choose value added as the measure of economic activity. It has the advantage
of incorporating the contribution of both capital and labour, as well as variation in productivity.
Unfortunately, there is no information on price levels between regions within Member States
which distorts the value added data. For this reason some prefer employment when working with
disaggregate regional data.
Geographical economists repeatedly run into the problem of choosing the relevant industrial
and geographical scale (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). Ideally, real world industries and
regions correspond to their theoretical counterparts. In practice, there is a tradeoff between
industrial and regional detail. Some researchers choose a ﬁne grid of 36 manufacturing
industries which are available at the NUTS0 level.6 Others choose the coarser grid of seventeen
industries which are available at the NUTS2 level. The geographical scope of the NEG is, as we
will argue, by and large restricted to sets of NUTS2 and NUTS3 regions. This suggests that there
is something to gain from sacriﬁcing even more industrial detail for the sake of regional detail.
We will substantiate this in section 3.3.
The simplest no-clustering benchmark is the uniform distribution. The corresponding types
of concentration and specialisation are dubbed ‘absolute’ since they do not incorporate variation
of industry respectively variation of region size. Absolute specialisation is about whether a few
regions tend to account for a large share of economic activity of an industry. Absolute
concentration is about whether a few industries tend to account for a large share of economic
activity of a region.
A more complex no-clustering benchmark is the distribution of total economic activity. The
corresponding types of concentration and specialisation are dubbed ‘relative’. Relative
concentration is about whether regions tend to account for a large share of economic activity of
an industry relative to their average share in all other industries. Relative specialisation is about
whether industries tend to account for a large share in the economic activity of a region relative
to their average share in all other regions.
The difference between absolute and relative clustering can best be explained by means of an
example. The employment shares of agriculture, manufacturing and services or any other
comprehensive set of industries deﬁnes the industrial structure of a region. For Paris these shares
amounted in 1998 to 0.05%, 10.24%, respectively 89.70%, and for Chelmsko-Zamojski (Poland)
to 53.31%, 14.74%, respectively 31.96%.
The importance of services makes Paris the most specialised region in absolute terms.
Nevertheless, as services are important in all European regions it does not make Paris the most
6 NUTS stands for Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units, running from NUTS0 (Member States) to NUTS3 (sub
provincial regions). For example, NUTS0 corresponds to Germany, NUTS1 to Länder, NUTS2 to Regierungsbezirke, and
NUTS3 to Kreise (European Commission, 2003).
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specialised region in relative terms.7 In contrast, Chelmsko-Zamojski qualiﬁes as the most
specialised region in relative terms. Nevertheless, as the uniform distribution prescribes a
employment share of agriculture of 33.33%, Chelmsko-Zamojski ranks low in absolute terms.
Figure 3.3 visualises the point. Compare the economic structure of Paris, displayed in the left
panel, to the relative benchmark, displayed in the right panel, and it is clear that they are
different. Then compare the economic structure of Paris to the absolute benchmark and it is clear
that they are even more different. The same exercise can be repeated for Chelmsko-Zamojski,
and this leads to the reverse conclusion.















Relative benchmark Absolute benchmark
agriculture manufacturing services
a Variable: employment (in thousands of employees).
Source: EUROSTAT REGIO-database; CPB Regional Economics and Spatial Analysis Unit; Nationale Instituut voor Statistiek van België.
Aggregation: NUTS3 and NUTS2 (Berlin, Greek NUTS2 regions, Ceuta and Melilla, Austrian, and Portuguese NUTS2 regions, and
Latvia).
Concentration is assessed in a similar manner. The sole difference with specialisation is that
instead of a comparison of industrial structures of regions, it involves a comparison of regional
structures of industries.
There are two additions to concentration indices. First, Ellison and Glaeser (1997) take the
number of ﬁrms per industry into account. The reason is that if individual ﬁrms make their
location choice at random, the resulting distribution of industrial economic activity over the
regions (or over units of total economic activity of regions) will not be uniform for industries
comprising only a few ﬁrms. Second, Brülhart and Traeger (2003) coined topographic
concentration, where region size is not controlled for by total economic activity but by land
mass.
Combes and Overman (2003) note that there has been no systematic attempt to outline the
criteria by which we should assess the statistic measuring the variation in the spatial distribution
of economic activity. Hence they propose a baseline. The statistic should
7 For a formal exposition of how specialisation indices map the distribution of industry value added to a scalar see
appendix A.
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1. be comparable across economic activities
2. be comparable across spatial scales
3. take a unique known value under the no-clustering benchmark
4. be amenable to the calculation of conﬁdence intervals
5. be insensitive to change in industrial or regional classiﬁcation
6. respond to the clustering brought about by the agglomeration forces stressed by the theoretical
literature.
For practical purposes, these criteria are too stringent. There is no single statistic that satisﬁes all
criteria. The ‘best game in town’ appears, however, to be the Theil index, primarily because it
can be decomposed into within and between group variation.8 A viable alternative is Moran’s I.
It lacks the decomposability of the Theil index, but takes the spatial conﬁguration of regions
explicitly into account by means of a distance matrix.9
In our review of the existing literature, we conﬁne ourselves to recent studies that consider
European data for (sets of regions of) more than one Member State. Table 3.1 lists the main
results of these studies. They consistently report substantial levels of concentration and
specialisation. Furthermore, they reveal that changes – indicated by a plus and a minus – tend to
be slow. It is conceivable that only a few of the changes are statistically signiﬁcant as the papers
do not report conﬁdence intervals. The exception is Brülhart and Traeger (2003).
It seems that there is no consensus on the stylised facts. Three out of four columns of table
3.1 contain both plus and minus signs. The characteristics of the studies explain, however, part
of the variation of the results. In particular, country studies tend to ﬁnd increasing concentration
and specialisation, whereas regional studies tend to ﬁnd the opposite. Furthermore, concentration
and specialisation diverge, even though they conceptually are each other’s mirror image.
The contrary motion of specialisation and concentration is easily resolved. Aiginger and
Davies (2001) demonstrate that specialisation and concentration do not necessarily move in the
same direction in the presence of variation of industry and region size.
The empirical paradox regarding the orthogonal results of country and region studies is a
harder nut to crack. Country studies tend to use a relatively ﬁne grid of industries excluding
services. In contrast, region studies tend to use a coarser grid including services. Given the
increasing share of services in European value added, and given the dispersion of services
relative to manufacturing industries, it is therefore possible to see diverging trends in the two
types of studies. Moreover, Gorter (2001) points out that economic integration may have
allowed the forces behind concentration and specialisation to operate at the country level where
they previously had been conﬁned to regions within countries.
8 For a state of the art example of the application of the Theil index in spatial analysis see Brülhart and Traeger (2003).
9 For a theoretical discussion of Moran’s I, see Cliff and Ord (1981) and Tiefelsdorf and Boots (1995).
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Table 3.1 Concentration and specialisation
Concentration Specialisation Data Period
Absa Relb Absa Relb Industriesc Regionsd
Aiginger and Davies (2001) − + 99M 14 N0 1985-1998
Aiginger et al. (1999) − + 95M 14 N0 1988-1998
Aiginger and Leitner (2002) − − 10M 70 N1 1987-1995
Aiginger and Rossi-Hansberg (2003) − + 23M 14 N0 1987-1996
Amiti (1998) + + 27M 10 N0 1968-1990
Amiti (1999) + 65M 5 N0 1976-1989
Barrios and Strobl (2002) + 36M 15 N0 1972-1995
Brülhart (1998) + 18M 11 N0 1980-1990
Brülhart (2001) + 32M 13 N0 1972-1996
Brülhart and Torstensson (1998) + 18M 11 N0 1980-1990
Brülhart and Traeger (2003) 0 8 T 236 N2/3 1970-2000
De Nardis et al. (1996) 0 9M 56 N1 1980-1989
Gorter (2001) − − 17 T 119 N1/2 1980-1995
Greenaway and Hine (1991) + 28M 15 N0 1980-1985
Haaland et al. (1999) + + 35M 13 N0 1985-1992
Hallet (2000) − − 17 T 119 N1/2 1980-1995
Helg et al. (1995) + 8 T 11 N0 1975-1995
Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) + 9M 119 N1/2 1980-1995
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) + − 36M 13 N0 1970-1997
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2002) + 36M 14 N0 1970-1999
Molle (1997) − − 17 T 96 N0-2 1950-1990
a Abs = Absolute
b Rel = Relative
c Industries: number and type of industries (M = manufacturing, T = agriculture, manufacturing, and services)
d Regions: number and type of regions (Ni: NUTSi, i=0,1,2,3)
Our own calculations point at stability. The solid lines in Figure 3.4 display the evolution of
concentration in Europe. Absolute concentration is more or less constant, and relative
concentration has decreased. This indicates that, on average, the number of regions in which an
industry produces its value added did not change much over the sample period, and that the
variation in this number has decreased. The dotted lines in Figure 3.4 display concentration
where industry shares are ﬁxed at their 1980 levels. Thus, the difference between both lines
corresponds to the impact of changes in the size distribution of industries – i.e. the increasing
importance of services – on the concentration index. Clearly, the decline in relative
concentration evaporates when one statistically removes this impact.
Figure 3.5 displays the evolution of relative and absolute specialisation in Europe. The solid
and dotted lines correspond to variable respectively ﬁxed region weights. Since they move in
unison, we do not have to worry about impact of changes in the size distribution of regions on
the specialisation index. Absolute specialisation has increased. This is again due to an increase
of the importance of services, which drives regions away from the absolute specialisation
benchmark. Relative specialisation has decreased. This is due to convergence of regions with an
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relative concentration idem, with fixed industry weights
a Concentration of industries with the absolute benchmark of all N regions containing a similar share (= 1/N) of all industries and the
relative benchmark of all regions containing industry-shares equal to their aggregate production shares.
Source: own calculations based on Gross Value Added data from Hallet (2000), including 17 industries (agriculture, 10 manufacturing
sectors and 6 service sectors) in 119 NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions.
old fashioned structure, such as Chelmsko-Zamojski, where the importance of services has
increased more rapidly than in regions with a more mature economic structure, such as Paris.
In short, there is signiﬁcant concentration and specialisation. Absolute and relative
concentration are constant; the changes of absolute and relative specialisation boil down to an
increasing importance of services, most notably in regions with an old fashioned economic
structure where agriculture and manufacturing are still important.
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1980 1985 1990 1995
relative specialisation idem, with fixed country weights
a Specialisation of regions with the absolute benchmark of all industries equally large and evenly spread over all regions and the relative
benchmark of all industries as large as the European average, but evenly spread over all regions. The dotted lines represent the special
case where the relative size of the regions has been held ﬁxed at the 1980-levels.
Source: see Figure 3.4.
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3.3 Agglomeration
Concentration and specialisation give information about the regional structure of industries and
the industrial structure of regions. They are, however, silent about the agglomeration of
economic activity per se, i.e. the sum of the value added of all industries. The evidence for this
phenomenon is relatively scarce: none of the studies listed in Table 3.1 pays due attention to
agglomeration.
This is remarkable, given that the NEG stresses agglomeration, while the more traditional
trade literature is more concerned with concentration and specialisation (Brakman and Garretsen,
2003). In this section we attempt to ﬁll this gap in the empirical literature. Our calculations
reveal that agglomeration is signiﬁcant, that it is, just as concentration and specialisation, stable
over time, and that it prevails predominantly at the NUTS3 level of regional disaggregation.








1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
nuts0 nuts1 nuts2 nuts3
a Agglomeration of employment for 657 NUTS3 regions in nine European countries ( Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden). Agglomeration is measured as the Theil index of topographic concentration with land mass as
weights.
Source: Cambridge Econometrics regional database.
Figure 3.6 displays the Theil agglomeration index. It is a measure of the variation in the
distribution of economic activity over the set of regions.10 Clearly, agglomeration is signiﬁcant
and stable. Equally important is, however, that agglomeration is most saliently manifest at the
NUTS3 level of disaggregation. This can be inferred from the decomposition of the Theil index
10 For details, see appendix A.
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into four parts, indicated by the four coloured surfaces in Figure 3.6. They correspond to a
core-periphery pattern between NUTS3 regions within NUTS2 regions, between NUTS2 regions
within NUTS1 regions, between NUTS1 regions within NUTS0 regions, and between NUTS0
regions.
The core-periphery pattern of NUTS3 regions within NUTS2 regions accounts for almost
half of the total value of the Theil index, while there is virtually no variation between NUTS2
regions within NUTS1 regions. This, in conjunction with the locality of agglomeration
spillovers, lies at the root of our claim that the NEG is relevant at a disaggregated geographical
scale.
The Theil index does not take the spatial ordering of regions into account. It is, for example,
blind to the contiguity of the regions that constitute the ‘banana’. Imagine that these regions are
scattered over Europe. The Theil index would have yielded the same value, even though there is
less clustering. For this reason we alternatively measure agglomeration with Moran’s I, deﬁned
here as spatial auto correlation of regional employment per square kilometre.11 It yields a
positive value if regions with an above average density of economic activity tend to be spatially
clustered, and a negative value if the economic geography displays a chessboard pattern.








0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
hours
a The x-axis depicts the distance between regions within half an hour travel time, between half an hour and one hour travel time, etc. The
bars depict Moran’s I, and the grey area the 95% conﬁdence interval.
Source: own calculations for Gross Value Added in 2177 NUTS3 regions in 2000 with data from Cambridge Econometrics.
11 For details, see appendix A.
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Figure 3.7 displays Moran’s I. The vertical axis corresponds to the value of the statistic itself,
and the horizontal axis to different assumptions regarding spatial contiguity. In particular, the
bars give the value of Moran’s I for NUTS3 regions within half an hour travel time, between half
an hour and one hour travel time, between one hour and one and a half hours travel time, etc.,
while the grey area gives the 95% conﬁdence interval.
A glance at Figure 3.7 reveals that spatial auto correlation between nearby regions is
statistically signiﬁcant, but that it disappears once one considers regions that lie somewhat
further apart. Curious is the reappearance of a signiﬁcant positive spatial auto correlation for
regions that lie between two and a half and three hours travel time. It echoes the fractal nature of
clustering observed by van Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (2003). The prime conclusion
remains, however, that positive spatial auto correlation can most clearly be found for genuinely
contiguous regions. It lends support to the importance of the NEG when considering the
economic geography at a disaggregated scale.
3.4 Conclusion
The measurement of economic geography is fraught with difﬁculties. Yet we can draw a number
of rough conclusions on the basis of descriptive statistics:
1. Concentration of industries is constant. Over the past decades industries have remained where
they are, both in absolute and in relative terms.
2. Specialisation of regions has changed. This is paradoxal since concentration of industries and
specialisation of regions are theoretically each other’s mirror image. Close examination of the
data reveals that the change in specialisation is almost entirely due to the increasing importance
of services.
3. Agglomeration is stable. The balance between core regions and their periphery has not tipped in
favour of either category.
4. Agglomeration is local. It is most pronounced at a sub provincial scale.
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4 Dispersion and Agglomeration
4.1 Introduction
The descriptive statistics of chapter 3 establish that stable and local agglomeration is the essence
of the European economic geography. As Combes and Overman (2003) point out, the statistics
only describe, but do not explain or predict the spatial distribution of economic activity. The
present chapter ﬁts more tightly with theory. We give empirical support to the NEG by verifying
a spatial wage structure, and identify the prevailing equilibrium regime of a typical pair of
contiguous European regions. It turns out that agglomeration tends to be the rule at a (sub)
provincial level of regional aggregation. In this light the poor record of regional policy in
reducing regional disparities should not come as a surprise.
4.2 The Tomahawk and the Bell
The traditional Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade is based on perfect competition
and constant returns to scale. As we point out in chapter 2, this theory explains specialisation
and concentration, but has little to say about agglomeration. The NEG stresses the importance of
economies of scale and trade costs. In their presence the location decisions of economic agents
become important.
Krugman (1991) adds increasing returns to scale, location choice, and trade costs to the trade
theory. He thus builds the proto NEG model that puts geography at the heart of the analysis. The
predictions are strong: a system of regions leaps from dispersion into agglomeration once the
freeness of trade surpasses a break point. The proto NEG model is therefore best interpreted as a
theoretical framework to be extended by auxiliary assumptions for practical purposes.
Puga (1999) does exactly this. He develops a model that is more in line with the European
reality. It yields a smoother transition from dispersion to agglomeration, and allows for
dispersion at high degrees of market integration.
He puts the NEG models in two classes.12 The ﬁrst class comprises models that, against a
background of gradually increasing freeness of trade, move from dispersion to agglomeration.
The second class comprises models that do the same, but return to dispersion once the wage gap
drives ﬁrms to the periphery. We call the ﬁrst class of models the ‘tomahawk’, and the second
class the ‘bell’, after the resemblance of the locus of long run equilibria to a tomahawk hatchet
respectively a church bell.13
12 For an extensive discussion of the details of the proto NEG model, see Brakman et al. (2001, ch.3&4) and Fujita et al.
(1999, ch.4&5).
13 For a discussion of other determinants of the tomahawk and the bell, see the textbox on page 37.
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The tomahawk
Figure 4.1 displays the tomahawk-shaped locus of long run equilibria. The underlying model
contains two regions which initially host a similar amount of ﬁrms and workers. Workers
employed by mobile ﬁrms producing varieties of a good that can be exported to the other regions
at a certain cost, can move between regions. The distribution of mobile economic activity is
related to the freeness of trade.






a The x-axis depicts the freeness of trade φ. The y-axis shows the share of mobile production in the core region λ ∈ [0,1].
For low values of φ, the regions are subject to a dispersion regime: centrifugal forces outweigh
centripetal forces. From φ0
B onwards, agglomeration becomes proﬁtable, and the regions are
subject to the agglomeration regime: centripetal forces outweigh centrifugal forces. Here the
circular causality of location choice comes into play which drives the economic geography from
the uniform distribution (λ = 0.5) to extreme agglomeration (λ = 1). Note that the economic
geography never returns to dispersion. The single centrifugal force of price competition is too
weak to destabilise the agglomeration.
The tomahawk has an idiosyncrasy. If φ decreases instead of increases, then agglomeration is
sustained up to φS < φ0
B. Since the freeness of trade tends to increase in practice, we let the
complications related to this inequality rest.14
14 For a discussion of the difference between the break point and the sustain point, see Neary (2001), Robert-Nicoud
(2004) and Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2004).
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Choosing between the tomahawk and the bell
Which model is most relevant for the economic geography of Europe? Three ingredients matter: wage ﬂexibility, labour
mobility and urban costs. Krugman (1991) assumes mobile labour and ﬂexible wages, and abstracts from urban costs.
This yields the tomahawk. Puga (1999) assumes labour immobility. This yields the bell. If wages are rigid the tomahawk
reappears, however only in the absence of urban costs.
Picking the relevant NEG modela
Tomahawk Bell Tomahawk Bell
Wage ﬂexibility yes yes no yes
Labour mobility yes no no yes
Urban costsa no yes
Key reference Krugman (1991) Puga (1999) Puga (2002) Helpman (1998)
a Other than the wage gap between core and peripheral regions due to interregional labour immobility.
In our view, the relevant model depends on the size of regions: the empirical relevance of wage ﬂexibility increases in
the level of aggregation (e.g. wages vary more between countries than within countries), while labour mobility and urban
costs decrease in it (workers are reluctant to move to distant locations; urban costs such as congestion play a relatively
large role in cities). In our view, the bell curve is the safest bet for analyses using European data. At the sub provincial
level, labour may be mobile, but then urban costs come into play.
The Bell
If labour is immobile then agglomeration of ﬁrms pushes up wages in the core. This chokes off
the circular causality of location choice, and makes the economic geography return to a uniform
distribution once the freeness of trade surpasses a second break point.
Supplier access and the elasticity of labour supply now take centre stage. Access to cheap
intermediate inputs induces a preference of ﬁrms for location in the core region beyond the ﬁrst
break point. However, as they need to persuade labour employed by immobile ﬁrms to work for
them, they have to offer higher wages. This reduces the incentive for location in the core and
ultimately brings the economic geography back to the dispersion regime.
Figure 4.2 displays the bell shaped locus of long run equilibria. The underlying model has
two similar regions, with an initial uniform distribution of labour. Labour employed by ﬁrms
producing varieties of the manufacturing good can move between sectors, but not between
regions.
For low freeness of trade (φ < φB) and high freeness of trade (φ > φB), the regions are
subject to dispersion; for intermediate freeness of trade (φB < φ < φB) the circular causality
sustains an uneven distribution of economic activity. Agglomeration is, however, never as
extreme as in the tomahawk due to the addition of centrifugal forces independent of trade cost.
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a The x-axis shows the freeness of trade φ, the y-axis shows the share λ of mobile production in the core region.
For either model, we need to identify the actual freeness of trade as well as the break point(s) if
we want to know whether or not regional policy has to swim against the tide of the market forces
that foster agglomeration. This matter is the subject of the next sections.
4.3 The Wage Equation
A key prediction of both classes of NEG models is that wages are higher in agglomerations. This
holds in the short run, i.e. for a given distribution of ﬁrms and workers.
The wage equation ‘closes’ the model, by equating demand to supply on all regional product
markets. Each ﬁrm of the mobile sector produces one variety of a good. It is demanded in all
regions, some nearby, some further away. Demand comes from ﬁnal consumption and
intermediate input by other ﬁrms. Equating demand to supply on each regional market gives the
equilibrium price for each ﬁrm. It is standard practice to rewrite this equilibrium condition to a
wage equation that maps the market access of a region to the zero proﬁt wage in a given region.














with φrs = T1−ε
rs (4.1)
where:
15 For a formal derivation, see appendix B.1.
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Wr is the nominal wage rate in region r
Ys is the market size of region s, deﬁned as the demand for ﬁnal consumption and intermediate
inputs
Is is the price index for manufactured goods
ε is the elasticity of substitution for manufactured goods (a high value of ε means that ﬁrms are
close competitors)
Trs are the transport costs between regions r and s, deﬁned as the number of goods to be
transported over one unit of distance for one unit to arrive
Drsis distance between regions r and s
µ is the share of intermediates in the inputs for a ﬁrm’s production process.
Scaling yields the freeness of trade parameter φrs ∈ [0,1], where φrs = 0 corresponds to inﬁnite
trade costs, and φrs = 1 to zero trade costs.
Wr increases in the market size Ys and in the freeness of trade φrs. We dub the term between
brackets on the right hand side of equation (4.1) market access. Note the resemblance to the well
known gravity or market potential equation. Wr also decreases in the competition a ﬁrm located
in r faces. This is the competition effect captured by Is. Prices are ﬁxed mark ups over marginal
costs and there is no strategic interaction between ﬁrms. A low Is reﬂects the number of varieties
produced by competitors in nearby regions: the higher is this number, the lower is Is, the lower is
the demand for a given variety, hence the lower is Wr at which a ﬁrm breaks even. A low price
index implies, moreover, that suppliers of intermediate inputs are located in nearby regions.
Hence Redding and Venables (2000) dubbed the term I
−µ/(1−µ)
r supplier access. The lower are
prices of intermediary inputs, the better is supplier access, hence the higher isWr. If one
abstracts from intermediate inputs by setting µ = 0, supplier access drops out, and the wage
equation comprises only market access.
The wage equation deﬁnes a system of equations in W, Y, and I. It is a short run equilibrium,
i.e. equilibrium on all markets for a given spatial distribution of ﬁrms and workers. Nevertheless,
the wage equation sufﬁces for the estimation of the key parameters T and ε. Armed with these
estimates we can tackle the long run process of agglomeration by plugging them into a model
and derive their implications in a ‘theory with numbers’ fashion. The short run nature is an
advantage, since the differences between NEG models only come to the fore if one considers the
long run. Therefore, the estimates apply to a wide range of NEG models.
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4.4 A Spatial Wage Structure
Are wages in core regions relatively high, as the NEG wage equation suggests? To answer this








with r ∈ EU14+ (4.2)
where:
Wr is the average remuneration per employee in region r
EU+is an index set containing all NUTS2 regions (NUTS1 for Germany) of the EU14
(Luxembourg excluded), Norway, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Switzerland
Ys is total gross value added of region s as given by the Cambridge Econometrics regional
database, supplemented with the AMECO price deﬂator of national gross domestic product
to control for differences in purchasing power.
The function, well known from the gravity approach to international trade and investment
(Harrigan, 2001), says that wages are lower the further a region is away from regions with high
production.
The parameters of interest are κ1, that measures the strength of agglomeration advantages,
and κ2, that measures how quickly agglomeration advantages decay over distance. In other
words, κ1 measures how much market potential matters in terms of wages, and κ2 how
advantageous it is to be located in an agglomeration relative to its immediate surroundings. The
combination of κ1 and κ2 deﬁnes a spatial wage structure. Table 4.1 displays the results of the
OLS ﬁrst-difference estimation including a constant:
















Table 4.1 A spatial wage structure on the basis the market potential functiona
Coefﬁcient Standard Error
κ1 Strength of agglomeration advantages 0.8984 0.020
κ2 Distance decay of agglomeration advantages 0.0133 0.001
R2 0.61
a OLS estimation of equation (4.3).
Sample: 1992–2000, with 1647 observations.
In spite of wage rigidity and national wage bargaining, the signs of the estimates conﬁrm the
spatial wage structure predicted by the NEG. This is in line Niebuhr (2004), one of the few
alternative estimations using European data.
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The values of κ1 and κ2 are difﬁcult to interpret. In order to get a feel for them, we conduct a
thought experiment: how much higher would wages in Nordrhein-Westfalen be if the size of its
market would be ten percent larger, and how much higher would wages be in nearby regions
such as Gelderland?






The ten percent larger market in Nordrhein-Westfalen translates into dYs = 0.10Ys. This,
combined with the estimates κ1 = 0.898 and κ2 = 0.013 gives a wage increase of 0.7% in the
epicentre of the shock. The advantage of the larger production quickly decays over distance. At
one hundred kilometres away only a quarter of this agglomeration advantage remains. This
concords with the locality of core-periphery structures established in chapter 3. And the distance
decay is found by other estimations of this kind. Figure 4.3 visualises the thought experiment. A
dark shade of grey indicates a high wage response to the income shock. Clearly, only nearby
regions beneﬁt.
Figure 4.3 Impact on wages of an income shock in Nordrhein-Westfalena
a Calculations are based on equation (4.4) with the parameters of Table 4.1.
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4.5 The Freeness of Trade
The freeness of trade can be inferred from the estimation of the wage equation (4.1). It depends
on the transport costs T and the elasticity of substitution ε. Estimation of these parameters is
somewhat problematic due to the absence of data on regional price indices Is. We bypass Is by
imposing additional structure on the underlying NEG model. In particular, we eliminate Ir from
equation (4.1) by relating it to Wr and by assuming µ = 0.16 In addition, to control for
exogenous differences in technology we include regional labour productivity PLr relative to the
mean of the EU+ sample.17 Since ﬁrst nature causes also matter we include a vector FN
containing hours of sunshine, altitude above sea level, and access to the open sea that is available
























The Glesjer test rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. Hence the preferred estimation
method is weighted least squares. Table 4.2 displays the results. The estimates of the key
parameters are in line with the ﬁndings of Head and Ries (2001) and Head and Mayer (2003a).
Table 4.2 A spatial wage structure on the basis of the wage equationa
Coefﬁcient Standard Error
ε Elasticity of substitution 8.0524 0.8637
log(T) Transport cost 0.0004 0.00005
R2 0.9996
a WLS estimation of equation (4.5).
Sample: 1991–2000, with 1670 observations.
Parameters of ﬁrst nature variables and country dummies are not reported.
The signs of the parameters again verify a spatial wage structure. Wages in core regions, deﬁned
as regions with high production per squared kilometre, exceed those of peripheral ones.
The estimates for the transport costs and the elasticity of substitution will prove to be crucial
in assessing the spatial regime of European regions. They imply the function
φrs = 1.0004−7.05Drs, which maps the distance Drs between two regions r and s to the freeness of
trade φrs between them, as shown in ﬁgure 4.4. Of course, the longer is the distance, the lower is
the freeness of trade.18 The average distance between a pair of NUTS2 regions is 620km, which
corresponds to φ = 0.18. The average distance between a pair of contiguous NUTS2 regions is
16 For details, see Brakman et al. (2004a) and appendix B.3. The assumption µ = 0 yields a convenient speciﬁcation as
supplier access drops out of the wage equation. This is, as Robert-Nicoud (2004) and Ottaviano (2003) claim, the best
empirical strategy given the isomorphic quality of NEG models. The qualitative results hold, however, also for alternative
speciﬁcations with µ > 0.
17 For details, see appendix B.2.
18 Brakman et al. (2004b) show that the results are robust to alternative, non exponential functional forms.
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a The x-axis shows the freeness of trade between two regions, and the y-axis shows the distance between them in kilometres.
148km, which corresponds to φ = 0.66. Both values are depicted on the vertical axis.19 In the
next section, we confront these values with the break points of the tomahawk and bell.
4.6 The Equilibrium Regime
Is a typical pair of contiguous NUTS2 regions subject to an agglomeration regime? In other
words, do the inequalities φ > φ0
B or φB < φ < φB hold? The break points play a key role in
answering this question. They are, however, only instrumental, and do not serve to emphasise
the instability of the economic geography. On the contrary, we will ﬁnd that a typical pair of
contiguous NUTS2 regions are subject to an agglomeration equilibrium, which implies stability
of the economic geography.
The tomahawk can be solved for the breakpoint φ0
B, and the bell for the breakpoints φB and
φB. Unfortunately, this requires that the number of regions is restricted to two, or that all regions
lie at an equal distance from each other.20 We choose to consider a single pair of regions at a
time as the assumption of equal distances ﬂies in the face of reality. Computer simulations on the
basis of a multi-region model with unequal distances remains possible. Our analysis in this
19 Brakman et al. (2004b) use an alternative speciﬁcation. This yields a lower estimate of ε but an offsetting higher
estimate of T. Consequently, the implied φ for pairs of (contiguous) NUTS2 regions remains virtually unchanged (0.22
and 0.70, instead of 0.18 and 0.66).
20 Personal communication with Puga.
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Table 4.3 The Break Points
µ η δ ε φB φB φ0
B
Benchmark conﬁguration 0.30 200 0.10 8.00 0.29 0.91 0.09
Alternative conﬁgurations 0.20 200 0.10 8.00 0.51 0.82 0.18
0.20 200 0.10 4.00 0.44 0.90 0.05
0.20 250 0.10 8.00 0.48 0.87 0.14
0.20 200 0.05 8.00 0.51 0.82 0.32
section, where we use the empirical estimations of the key parameters with a two region
theoretical model closely follows Crozet (2004) and is explained in more detail in Brakman et al.
(2004b).
Let us ﬁrst consider the tomahawk. Puga (1999) demonstrates that the break point is a
function of four model parameters: φ0
B = f(µ,η,δ,ε), where µ is the share of intermediate
inputs, η is the elasticity of intersectoral labour supply with respect to wages, δ the share of the
mobile good in total expenditures, and ε is the substitution elasticity of varieties.21 The bell,
based on labour immobility, is somewhat more complicated. Puga (1999) demonstrates that, if
certain conditions are met, φB and φB are the roots of the quadratic equation aφ2+bφ +c = 0,
where a,b,c functions of µ,η,δ and ε. 22
For both the tomahawk and the bell the range of φ that supports agglomeration increases in
µ, η, and δ, and decreases in ε.23 A larger share of intermediate inputs µ fosters agglomeration
because it makes co-location of ﬁrms more proﬁtable. A larger elasticity of intersectoral labour
supply η fosters agglomeration because it makes it more easy to lure workers from the immobile
to mobile sector. A larger share of the mobile good δ fosters agglomeration because it reduces
the size of costly ‘exports’ to the periphery. A larger substitution elasticity ε, in contrast,
restrains agglomeration because it increases the centrifugal competition effects.
Table 4.3 lists the break points for ε = 8, µ = 0.3, η = 200, and δ = 0.1. This is our
benchmark conﬁguration, with ε taken from Table 4.2, and with µ, η, and δ probed on the basis
of Puga (1999) and Head and Mayer (2003a). Table 4.3 also gives the break points for a number
of other parameter conﬁgurations.
By and large, the range of φ supporting an agglomeration equilibrium is smaller in the bell
than in the tomahawk. In addition, the dispersion equilibrium destabilises earlier in the
tomahawk, as φ0
B < φB. This is unsurprising, as the bell comprises trade cost independent
centrifugal forces that are absent in the tomahawk. Moreover, in either model the range is
sensitive to the chosen conﬁguration, however not to the extent that it endangers our main
21 Our calculations are based on equation (16) in Puga (1999), if µ = η = 0 equation (16) gives the break point for
Krugman (1991).
22 Our calculations are based on equation (33) in Puga (1999), see also section 14.4 in Fujita et al. (1999).
23 See appendix B.1 for a formal derivation. The intuition can most easily be grasped with Table 2.1 at hand.
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conclusion. We will come back to this point shortly. First we need to confront the estimated
freeness of trade from Table 4.2 with the break points from Table 4.3.
Figure 4.5 depicts the freeness of trade function φrs = 1.0004−7.05Drs, just as in ﬁgure 4.4. It
adds the breakpoints φ0
B = 0.09, φB = 0.29 and φB = 0.91, which corresponds to the distances
846, 443 and 34km. The dots on the curve correspond to (620,0.176) and (148,0.661), the
points containing the distance and the freeness of trade between a typical pair of NUTS2 regions
respectively a typical pair of contiguous NUTS2 regions.
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a The x-axis shows the freeness of trade between two regions, and the y-axis shows the distance between them in kilometres.
The two dots on the curve correspond to the average (φ,Drs) of a pair of arbitrary NUTS2 regions at Drs =620 and of a pair of contiguous
NUTS2 regions at Drs = 148.
The mean internal distance 0.376
√
Ar, where Ar is the area of region r, equals 42km. This can be taken into account by increasing the
critical values of Drs by 42 kilometres.
The location of the dots reveals that, within the conﬁnes of the bell model, a typical pair of
NUTS2 regions is subject to dispersion. They are in the pre-agglomeration range. If labour
mobility would increase dramatically, which implies a shift towards to tomahawk model, or if
the freeness of trade would increase dramatically due to economic integration, the agglomeration
regime may become material. More relevant is, however, that a typical pair of contiguous
NUTS2 regions is subject to agglomeration. They are right in the middle of the head of the bell
where the relative strength of the centripetal forces is at its peak.
We conduct a thought experiment to clarify the result. Suppose Paris is the sole core region
in Europe. Which peripheral regions are subject to an agglomeration, and which to a dispersion
equilibrium? We confront the estimated freeness of trade with the break points for all pair wise
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combination of Paris and other (NUTS3) regions in Europe. It turns out that a small number of
regions – which cover the Banlieu – lie close enough to Paris to be in the right skirt of the bell,
and thus are subject to a dispersion equilibrium on account of a high freeness of trade. A large
number of regions lie far enough from Paris to be in the left skirt of the bell, and thus are subject
to a dispersion equilibrium on account of a low freeness of trade. These groups of regions are
dark grey in ﬁgure 4.6. In between these two groups there is a number of regions that are subject
to an agglomeration equilibrium on account of an intermediate freeness of trade. This group of
regions is light grey in ﬁgure 4.6. They would struggle to retain economic activity since the
centripetal forces pulls it towards Paris and the Banlieu.
The reality is more complex because Paris is not the sole core region. The European
economic geography is a patchwork of overlapping core-periphery structures. It would be
overstretching the results to conclude anything for a particular pair of regions. It would also be
overstretching the results to conclude anything for the subset of regions with a freeness of trade
close to the break points. The estimates are too imprecise for that purpose. And the probability
of any given pair of regions being close to a break point is low.
In any event, ﬁgure 4.6 does capture the thrust of the geographical scope of the
agglomeration advantages. It ﬁts tightly with the descriptive statistics of chapter 3, which reveal
that more than 50% of total agglomeration is at the NUTS2 and NUTS3 scale. Moreover, it is
consistent with the ﬁndings of Crozet (2004), Forslid et al. (2002), Midelfart et al. (2003), and
Brülhart et al. (2004).
Figure 4.6 Agglomeration and dispersion around Parisa
a The bell in shades of grey, where Paris is assumed to be the sole core.
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4.7 A Sectoral Analysis
So far the analysis has been based on aggregate data, i.e. total value added per region. The
freeness of trade and the break points may, however, vary between sectors. In this section we
probe into this variation. The price for the sectoral disaggregation is, however, regional
aggregation, since the necessary data are only available at the NUTS0 level.
Head and Mayer (2003b) explain that φ can be estimated on the basis of bilateral trade and







mij are the imports of country i from country j
mji are the imports of j from i
mii is the value of all shipments minus the value of shipments from i to all other countries
mjj is the value of all shipments minus the value of shipments from j to all other countries.
If there is much bilateral trade relative to total turnover in the respective countries then the
estimator takes a high value and vice versa. Note that the detour via T, used in the previous
sections can be evaded.
Table 4.4 lists φ for eighteen industries, calculated on the basis of 1997 GTAP data. They are
confronted with the break points φ0
B and φB taken from the appendix of Head and Mayer (2003a).
All sectors, except Plastics and Drugs, Ferrous Metals, and Shipping/Railroad/Transport, are
in a dispersion equilibrium. This is unsurprising since φ is bound to be smaller at the NUTS0
level than at the NUTS2 level. The range of φ runs from 0.01 for Energy, to 0.25 for Machinery
and Computers. The break points also vary due different sector speciﬁc values of the model
parameters µ, η, δ, and ε. This variation between sectors qualiﬁes the result from the previous
sections. If there is sectoral variation at the NUTS0 level, then there is probably also variation at
the NUTS2 level. Thus, although contiguous pairs of NUTS2 regions tend to be in a
agglomeration equilibrium, this conclusion may not hold for some sectors.
4.8 Conclusion
A spatial wage structure in line with the predictions of the NEG exists. Wages tend to be high in
regions with a large market access. And the advantage of being in or close to an agglomeration
quickly peters out over distance, as the wage premium quickly decays once one moves away
from the core. Moreover, the expected freeness of trade between a pair of contiguous NUTS2
24 See also Head and Ries (2001) and Head and Mayer (2003a, p.7).
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Table 4.4 Sector speciﬁc values of φ for the EU15-accession countries a
IOcode Sector φ φ0
B φB
1 Agriculture 0.03 NA NA
2 Energy 0.01 NA NA
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.05 0.22 0.46
4 Clothing 0.14 0.18 0.21
5 Wood 0.05 0.36 0.39
6 Paper 0.03 0.16 0.17
8/10 Plastics and Drugs 0.13* 0.10 0.11b
9 Petro 0.02 0.71 DISP
11 Minerals 0.04 0.44 0.47
12 Ferrous metals 0.04* AGGL 0.00c
13 Non-ferrous metals 0.03 0.06 0.09
14 Fab. Metals 0.05 0.69 DISP
15/16 Machinery and Computers 0.25 0.36 0.43
17 Electrical 0.09 0.39 0.67
19/20 Shipping/Railroad/Transportd 0.01 0.39 0.46
21 Vehicles 0.13* 0.08 0.10e
23 Instruments 0.02 0.45 0.57
18 Services 0.16 NA NA
a Source: GTAP 1997.
NA = Not Available, DISP = Dispersion equilibrium for all φ, AGGL = Agglomeration equilibrium for all φ.
b Top of the bell: φ = 0.55.
c Top of the bell: φ = 0.50.
d Based on Railroad.
e Top of the bell: φ = 0.49.
* Freeness of trade is in agglomeration range, i.e. φ > φB.
regions is such that agglomeration equilibria tend to be the rule. For regions that lie further apart,
dispersion equilibria prevail. There is, however, a large variation of freeness of trade as well as




Regional policy often explicitly intends to lure economic activity to the periphery, and thus to
reduce agglomeration. ‘Objective 1’ funding in Europe and the ‘Kompas voor het Noorden’ in
the Netherlands are prime examples. Yet the descriptive statistics as well as the econometric
estimations presented in this study suggest that agglomeration is difﬁcult to counter, at least at a
disaggregated level of regional aggregation.
In this light it is opportune that governments review their regional policy. Reports such as
‘Pieken in de Delta’ (Minsterie van Economische Zaken, 2004) and the ‘Third Report’
(European Commission, 2004) reveal a refocus from interregional equity to overall efﬁciency.
The dogged effort to make lagging regions catch up is gradually replaced by a more ﬂexible
approach, in which regional policy is more in harmony with market forces.
The implications of this study are thus in line with the direction in which thinking about
regional policy is moving. A long run impact of policy is only to be expected if it is targeted on
regions that have a realistic chance of holding on to mobile economic activity. And if the policy
remains focused on lagging regions, the durability of its impact is maximised if it is targeted on
labour, since this is the production factor that is least likely to relocate to the core.
5.2 The Equity-Efﬁciency Trade-Off
The objectives of regional policy are sundry. Sometimes it is geared towards agglomeration, but
more often towards dispersion. European Cohesion policy embodies the two track approach. On
the one hand it places its bet on core regions by yearly spending billions of euros on projects
such as the Madrid ring road or the bridge crossing the river Tago. On the other hand it attempts
to achieve a “balanced spread” of economic activity by directing the bulk of the available funds
towards Extremadura, Alentejo, and other lagging regions.
The incoherence of the two track approach is conspicuous. Simultaneously promoting
agglomeration and dispersion is bound to be ineffective, irrespective of the validity of the NEG
as compared with the neoclassical trade theory. We conjecture that the incoherence stems from
the difﬁculty to strike a balance between boosting overall productivity and growth, which is
associated with agglomeration, and reducing regional disparities of wealth and employment,
which is associated with dispersion. In fact, the ‘Third Report’ describing the ofﬁcial position of
the European Commission on Cohesion Policy, conveniently sweeps the equity-efﬁciency
trade-off out of sight. It states: “Strengthening regional competitiveness throughout the Union
and helping people to fulﬁl their capacities will boost the growth potential of the EU economy as
a whole to the common beneﬁt of all” (European Commission, 2004, p. viii).
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The equity-efﬁciency trade-off does not, of course, disappear by negation. In chapter 2 we point
out that NEG models feature a positive relation between agglomeration and overall productivity.
The reason is that co-locating ﬁrms save on trade costs, broadly deﬁned as anything that impedes
trade between distant regions. Introducing endogenous growth into the models ampliﬁes the
trade-off: agglomeration increases the growth rate of both the core and its periphery; the core
settles, however, for the higher rate (Baldwin and Forslid, 1999). Finally, core regions tend to
account for a disproportionate amount of innovation as measured by the number of registered
patents (Bottazzi and Peri, 2003).
Policy makers should face up to the equity-efﬁciency trade-off. The evidence suggests, for
example, that cohesion policy sits uneasily with Lisbon agenda. Playing the ostrich leads to
unrealistic expectations regarding convergence, or the funding of projects that pull the economic
geography in opposite directions. Regional policy should not be overburdened with a set of
objectives that cannot possibly be achieved simultaneously.
5.3 Optimal Agglomeration
The optimal regional policy guides the development of the economic geography towards the
desired degree of agglomeration, that is towards the degree that strikes a balance between
interregional equity and overall productivity growth. The point that maximises social welfare is
hard to pin down for any real world core-periphery system. Is too much or too little business
activity agglomerated in Amsterdam, Den Haag, Rotterdam and Utrecht as compared with the
rest of the Netherlands? We do not have a ﬁrm answer. Moreover, changes of the economic
geography always involves winners and losers, see ﬁgure 2.3.
The difﬁculty lies in several externalities that work in different directions. Migrant workers
and ﬁrms do not take into account that their location decisions affect proﬁts and wages in the
origin as well as the destination region. There is, therefore, no guarantee that their individual
location decisions add up to the social optimum.
Even within the conﬁnes of theory there is no consensus. Baldwin et al. (2003) incline
towards too much agglomeration on the basis of a speciﬁc NEG model. Lammers and Stiller
(2000) are less determinate: they settle for a tie on the basis of a more comprehensive analysis.
There are, moreover, important issues outside the scope of the NEG. One can think of
preservation of historical land- or cityscapes, or the preservation of rural cultures.
The externalities present in the NEG justify regional policy. It remains, however, unclear
whether the policy should promote agglomeration or dispersion. Policy makers will have to
continue to rely on heuristics in order to determine the direction that their initiatives should take.
Besides, a one-size-ﬁts-all regional policy does not exist. The European economic geography is
an not a unity nor a set of unrelated regions. It is a patchwork of local core-periphery systems.
Some systems may beneﬁt from more agglomeration, others from more dispersion.
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5.4 Hysteresis
The Third Report notes that a disproportionate amount of investment ﬂows towards core regions,
that is towards locations where capital is abundant and productivity is high. Lagging regions
seem to lack competitiveness, to be interpreted as attractiveness as a place for business. The
Third Report goes on to advocate public spending on development of “suitable levels of physical
infrastructure [..], human capital, [..] and the capacity to innovate and use both existing
know-how and new technologies” (European Commission, 2004, p.xi).
The experience with regional policy casts doubt on the cogency of this competitiveness
paradigm. For example, the capacity of publicly funded seaports in Eemshaven and Delfzijl
continues to outstrip demand by a factor three in even the most optimistic scenario (Centraal
Planbureau, 1999). This negative experience is not exceptional. Virtually all independent
econometric assessments of cohesion policy conclude that the collection of funded projects have
had no signiﬁcant growth impact on the target regions (Ederveen et al., 2002).
According to the NEG, agglomeration externalities lock the European economic geography
into stable core-periphery systems that can only be upset if the freeness of trade is close to the
break points. This is what Baldwin et al. (2003) call hysteresis. Firms and workers prefer to
locate near markets, and markets are located where ﬁrms and workers reside. This circular
causality of location decisions gives the economic geography a ‘putty-clay’ character: the
location of a core-periphery system is indeterminate ex ante, but stable ex post (Ottaviano, 2002;
Baldwin et al., 2003). It explains why efforts to increase the competitiveness of existing
peripheral regions are often insufﬁcient to entice business activity from the core.
A thought experiment clariﬁes the point. Figure 5.1, which is similar to ﬁgure 2.2, depicts
the difference between the real wage in the core and the periphery under the assumption of
extreme agglomeration. Note that this wage gap is positive for intermediate freeness of trade. In
this domain a migrant would be worse off if he ventured out to the periphery. Hence, in this
domain the agglomeration equilibrium is stable. A transfer equal from the core to the periphery
equal to ﬁve percent of total gross value added perturbs the wage curve as indicated. The crux is
that even this large transfer hardly changes the domain in which agglomeration is stable.
A sufﬁciently large transfer would, of course, tip the balance in favour of the periphery. The
empirical evidence suggests, however, that the shock necessary to upset a typical agglomeration
equilibrium lies beyond the scope of the available funds for regional policy. Brakman et al.
(2004a) report that the bombing of German cities during World War II – which can be
interpreted as a perverse regional policy experiment – had only a minor impact on the German
economic geography: over 90% of all Western German cities had returned to their pre-war
population level by the early 1960s.
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a The continuous curve depicts the difference between the real wage in the core and the periphery under the assumption that footloose
business a activity agglomerates. The dotted curve depicts the wage gap for a transfer 5% of total income from the core to the periphery.
In short, the European economic geography is less malleable than regional policy makers like to
believe. Martin (1998) distinguishes two reasons why regional aid may have a positive impact on
convergence: a direct income effect and an indirect industrial location effect. Hysteresis implies
that the indirect industrial location effect fails to materialise.
5.5 Infrastructure
Regional policy is biased towards infrastructure. The European Commission (2004), for
example, channels EUR 4.5 billion annually towards transport projects in objective 1 regions.
This amounts to as much as 20% of the total available funds. In addition, it ﬁnances
trans-European networks (TEN-T) of cross-border routes, as well as secondary networks and
connections with the TEN-T.
The bias stems from a simple argument. Adequate infrastructure adds to competitiveness,
and competitiveness adds to regional growth. Hence, improving infrastructure helps lagging
regions to catch up.
The estimates of chapter 4 appear to lend support to the argument: market access and wages
are positively correlated. They concern, however, only the short run relation between market
access and wages, that is the relation under the assumption of a given spatial distribution of
business activity. The long run relation is more complex: persons make location decisions in
response to real wage differences, location decisions impact upon market access, and market
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access impacts – in its turn – on real wage differences. It is this circular causality that may lock
regions into an agglomeration equilibrium, and make regional policy ineffective.
The NEG stresses that stability of such an equilibrium depends critically on freeness of trade.
This makes new infrastructure a hazardous policy instrument. If it pushes the freeness of trade
beyond break point φB or φ0
B, then it enforces a core-periphery structure with its corresponding
spatial wage structure.
The intuition is that links between a periphery and a contiguous core increase everybody’s
market access. As a result, the periphery may become relatively less competitive. This induces a
shift of business activity to the core. Puga (2002) notes that new infrastructure in Europe is of a
hub-and-spoke nature which ampliﬁes the shift. Moreover, Forslid (2004) shows that even
intraregional infrastructure may induce agglomeration. The reason is that intraregional
infrastructure is in fact veiled interregional infrastructure. Links between locations within
peripheral regions are indirectly links between any one of these locations and the core.
5.6 Capital and Labour
Regional policy targets both capital and labour. The European Commission (2004) channels
EUR 2.5 billion annually towards small, medium sized, and large ﬁrms in objective 1 regions.
Simultaneously, it channels EUR 3.4 billion towards workers by funding labour market projects
such as vocational training.
We suspect that labour market projects are most effective in promoting convergence. The
reason is that subsidies for capital end up in the core if recipients decide to relocate. Worse still,
Dupont and Martin (2003) demonstrate that even if capital stays in the periphery, the subsidy
may harm convergence.
The paradox hinges on a subtle interplay between the freeness of trade and the return to
capital with an interregionally integrated capital market. Capitalists in either region beneﬁt. But
since there are more capitalists in the core than in the periphery, the subsidy increases
interregional income differences.
The mirror image of this negative result is that a subsidy to labour does have a lasting impact.
Labour is, by its immobility, less prone to agglomeration forces. Thus ‘human resources’ policy
may even help the problem regions at intermediate distances from their local core. Moreover,
ﬁgure 2.3 shows that the immobile production factor in the periphery loses out by
agglomeration. A subsidy compensates for the decrease of its remuneration.
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5.7 Conclusion
This study supports the direction in which thinking about regional policy is moving. More funds
are channeled to local cores as compared to local peripheries. This makes sense given the
prevalence of the agglomeration equilibrium. Core regions have a better chance to hold on to
mobile economic activity.
The downside is that a focus on local cores enforces disparities between provinces and
between regions within provinces. The equity-efﬁciency trade-off cannot be evaded. Local
peripheries beneﬁt absolutely, as agglomeration advantages emanate over distance, but not
relatively, as they quickly peter out. Whether this is something to be afraid off is unclear: more
agglomeration may or may not be beneﬁcial for social welfare, depending on the weight of
productivity and growth versus the weight of wage equality.
If the objective of regional policy remains reducing regional disparities, then large
infrastructure projects are a hazardous instrument. If they push the freeness of trade beyond the
second break point, then they trigger dominance of dispersion forces which beneﬁt the
periphery. But if they push the freeness of trade beyond the ﬁrst break point then they trigger
dominance of agglomeration forces which harm the periphery. Infrastructure may thus
accelerate a drift to the core. Targeting peripheral labour is better from the perspective of
regional convergence. It maximises the durability of the policy impact, since peripheral labour is
the most immobile production factor. It dampens, moreover, the increase of intraregional
inequality related to the agglomeration process.
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Concentration and Specialisation
Concentration is the extent of over or under representation of an industry in each element of a set



















f is an industry index
r is a region index
R is the total number of regions
x
f
r is the economic activity of industry f in region r
x f is total economic activity of industry f, år x
f
r
nr is the number of basic units of region r
n is the total number of basic units, år nr.
T f compares for each region r the relative economic activity of industry f, x
f
r /x f, with what it
should have been on the basis of the relative number of basic units nr/n. If they match
(x
f
r /x f = nr/n) then the comparison yields the value 0; if the industry is over represented
(x
f
r /x f > nr/n) then the comparison yields a positive number; if the industry underrepresented
(x
f
r /x f < nr/n) then the comparison yields a negative number. The logarithmic transformation
and the weights guarantee that T f increases in the inequality of the distribution of x f with
respect to n, and that its minimum value equals 0.
Since the Theil index measures the inequality of the distribution of x f with respect to n, the
choice of n determines the kind of concentration. If regions are chosen as basic units then
nr = 1 ∀r, and n = R. The no-concentration benchmark, i.e. the distribution of x f such that
T f = 0, is the uniform distribution of x f over the regions. This kind of concentration is called
absolute concentration. If square kilometres are chosen then nr = km2
r, en n = år km2
r. The
no-concentration benchmark is the uniform distribution of x f over square kilometres, and thus
over regions proportional to their land mass. This kind of concentration is called topographic
concentration. If total economic activity is chosen then nr = åf x
f
r , and n = x = år åf x
f
r . The
no-concentration benchmark is the uniform distribution of x f over units of x (gross value added
or employment), and thus over regions proportional to their economic size. This kind of
concentration is called relative concentration. Table A.1 gives a summary.
Specialisation is the extent of over- or under representation of a region in each element of a
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Table A.1 Concentration
nr n No-concentration benchmark
Absolute concentration 1 R Uniform distribution of x f over regions
Topographic concentration km2
r år km2
r Distribution of x f matches distribution of km2
Relative concentration åf x
f
r x Distribution of x f matches distribution of x
where:





nf is the number of basic units of industry f
n is the total number of basic units, å
F
f=1nf.
Tr compares for each industry f the relative economic activity of the region x
f
r /xr with what it
should have been on the basis of the relative number of basic units nf/n. It equals T f, except
that the indices f and r trade places. This is logical: if industries concentrate then regions
specialise. Nevertheless, the equalities T f = Tr en dT f = dTr do not generally hold due to
variation in region and industry size.
The choice of n determines the kind of specialisation. If industries are basic units then
nf = 1 ∀f, and n = F. The no-specialisation benchmark is the uniform distribution of xr over
the industries. This kind of specialisation is called absolute specialisation. The alternative is
total economic activity, implying nf = år x
f
r , and n = x. The no-specialisation benchmark is the
uniform distribution of xr over the units of x, and thus a distribution of xr over the industries
proportional to their economic size. This kind of specialisation is called relative specialisation.
Table A.2 gives a summary.
Table A.2 Specialisation
nf n No-specialisation benchmark
Absolute specialisation 1 F Uniform distribution of xr over industries
Relative specialisation år x
f
r x Distribution of xr matches distribution of x
Agglomeration















where the distribution of total economic x is pitted against the distribution of n. Since comparing
the distribution of x with itself is trivial, the only choice options for n are regions and square
kilometres. The corresponding kinds of agglomeration could be called absolute and topographic
agglomeration.
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In order to verify at which level of economic aggregation agglomeration is most saliently
manifest we choose the following decomposition:
T3 = (T3−T2)+(T2−T1)+(T1−T0)+T0
where:











ri is a region index at NUTSi level.
Moran’s I-statistic is a spatial covariance with the weights wrs – measuring contiguity between
regions r and s – as a crucial extra element. It is the standard way to control for spatial
autocorrelation in regression analysis. It is deﬁned as:
I =
år ås wrszrzs




wrsis a measure of contiguity of regions r en s;
zr is a measure of relative economic activity of region r.






which roughly correspond to absolute and relative agglomeration. For wrs we can draw from a
distance-matrix with travel times in hours Drs between the capital cities of the regions r and s.
There inﬁnite possibilities to measure contiguity. Obvious possibilities are wrs = 1/Drs, or
wrs = (1/Drs)
2 if one wishes to stress direct contiguity. An elegant way to probe into the
subsets of regions that are spatially correlated is to deﬁne wrs by means of critical travel times:
choose for example wrs = 1 for Drs ≤ 1 and wrs = 0 in all other cases, and choose subsequently
wrs = 1 for 1 < Drs ≤ 2 and wrs = 0 in all other cases, etc. In other words, calculate Moran’s I
for regions within a radius of one hour travel time, subsequently for regions within one and two
hours travel time, etc. Table A.3 gives a summary.
Table A.3 Agglomeration and Spatial Autocorrelation
nr n No-agglomeration benchmark
Absolute agglomeration 1 R Uniform distribution of x over regions
Topographic agglomeration km2
r år km2
r Distribution of x matches distribution of km2
Absolute spatial autocorrelation Random distribution of x over regions
Topographic spatial autocorrelation Random distribution of x over km2
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58DERIVATION OF THE WAGE EQUATION
B Appendix: The Econometric Analysis
B.1 Derivation of the Wage Equation
In this appendix we derive the wage equation. The underlying NEG model rests heavily on Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) and Puga (1999).
Demand
The economy comprises two sectors: an immobile numeraire sector (often called agriculture),
and a mobile sector (often called manufacturing). The preferences of the representative





H is consumption of the good produced by the numeraire sector
M is consumption of the good produced by the mobile sector
δ is the share of income spent on the good produced by the mobile sector.














cj is consumption of variety j
pj is the price of variety j
ε = 1






is a price index
Y is (wage) income.





Firms also use varieties from the mobile sector as intermediate inputs. Assuming that all
varieties are necessary in the production process and that the elasticity of substitution is the same




ε−1E, E = δY +µX (B.4)
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where:
X is the value of intermediate inputs
µ is the share of intermediate inputs in the production process.
Supply




i (α +βxi) (B.5)
where:
xi is the quantity of variety i
C(xi)is the cost of production of xi
Wi is the wage rate
α is the ﬁxed input requirement
β is the marginal input requirement.













i (α +βxi) (B.7)





Equilibrium with Trade Costs
Transport of varieties is not for free. The ‘iceberg’ transport costs between regions 1 and 2 are:
TD12 > 1 (B.9)
where D12 is the distance between region 1 and 2.
Assume for the time being that there are no other regions. Total demand for a variety
produced in region 1 comes from consumers and ﬁrms in region 1 as well as region 2. But
consumers and ﬁrms located in region 2 have to pay a higher price due to the transportation








Note that the demand from region 2 is multiplied by TD12 in order to compensate for the part that
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Incorporation of the mark-up pricing rule in this last equation and solving for the wage rate
















where c is a function of model parameters.
Equation 4.1 that constitutes the basis of the estimations is the n regions version of equation
B.12. Imposing µ = 0 reveals that the proto Krugman (1991) model is a special case of this
more general model.
B.2 Incorporating Regional Productivity Differences





where βir is the region speciﬁc marginal input requirement.
The regional factor productivity is approximated by the difference in marginal labour
productivity in region r and the mean marginal labour productivity for the NUTS2 regions:
βir = PLEU+/PLir (B.14)


















































































Imposing µ = 0 yields equation (4.1).
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B.3 The Price Index
Data on regional prices are unavailable. Hence we are forced to approximate I. For each region
we focus on two prices: the price in region r of a variety produced in r and the mean price
outside r of a variety produced outside r. We obtain the mean distance r by weighing the








Regions with the largest market-potential are centres given by table B.1. The distance between a










¯ Wr is the mean wage outside district r
λr is region r’s share of employment in the mobile sector, proxied by the ratio of employment
in r and employment in EU+
Drrcis the distance from region r to its nearest economic centre.
This procedure allows direct estimation the wage equation with factor productivity differences
but without intermediate inputs.
The productivity gap between a region and the EU mean affects equation (B.21). With µ = 0,








where the subscript i has been dropped for notational simplicity.
62THE PRICE INDEX
Table B.1 Regions with largest Market Potential (MP)a
Region MP Region MP
1 Nordrhein-Westfalen 100 19 Zuid-Holland 66
2 Limburg 83 20 Zeeland 65
3 Limburg(B) 81 21 Nord-Pas de Calais 65
4 Luik 79 22 Saarland 65
5 Noord-Brabant 78 23 Luxembourg(B) 65
6 Vlaams-Brabant 77 24 West-Vlaanderen 64
7 Baden-Württemberg 77 25 Picardie 64
8 Rheinland-Pfalz 77 26 Champagne-Ard. 64
9 Gelderland 75 27 Alsace 63
10 Antwerpen 75 28 Noord-Holland 63
11 Waals-Brabant 75 29 Overijssel 62
12 Brussel 74 30 Flevoland 61
13 Namen 73 31 Niedersachsen 60
14 Utrecht 71 32 Lorraine 56
15 Ile de France 70 33 Vorarlberg 56
16 Oost-Vlaanderen 69 34 Ostschweiz 55
17 Hainaut 69 35 Zurich 55
18 Bayern 67
a 35 regions with the largest market potential in 1995, calculated for European NUTS2 regions with κ2 = 0.007 and normalized at
Nordrhein-Westfalen = 100.
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